The case centers on a 2016 suicide bombing at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan that permanently injured former Army Specialist Winston T. Hencely. The attacker, Ahmad Nayeb, was an Afghan national hired by Fluor Corporation under the military’s “Afghan First” initiative, which required contractors to maximize local hiring.
An Army investigation found Fluor primarily responsible for the attack due to negligent supervision. The report concluded that Fluor failed to escort Nayeb, allowed him to check out unauthorized tools, and permitted him to walk unsupervised for nearly an hour before the explosion.
Hencely sued Fluor in federal court in South Carolina, alleging negligent supervision, negligent entrustment of tools, and negligent retention under South Carolina law. The District Court granted summary judgment for Fluor, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, relying on a “battlefield preemption” doctrine.
The Fourth Circuit held that all state-law claims against military contractors under military command arising out of combatant activities are preempted, regardless of whether the contractor violated military instructions. The court reasoned that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant-activities exception reflects a congressional intent to bar such suits.
In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court rejected this broad rule. The Court held that neither the Constitution nor any federal statute expressly preempts Hencely’s suit. The Court noted that the FTCA’s combatant-activities exception does not apply to suits against federal contractors.
The Court distinguished its precedent in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., which involved a procurement contract and a “significant conflict” between state law and federal policy. The Court explained that Boyle protects a contractor only when the Government directed the contractor to do the very thing challenged in the suit.
Because Hencely sued Fluor for conduct that was not authorized by the military and was allegedly contrary to federal instructions, the Court found no significant conflict. The Court held that state law is not preempted when a contractor departs from military instructions.
The Court also rejected the argument that the Constitution’s structure implicitly bars war-related tort suits. The Court noted that federal contractors do not automatically share the Government’s immunity and that states can regulate federal contractors on the same terms as private companies absent a statute to the contrary.
The judgment of the Fourth Circuit was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, arguing that the Constitution preempts state law that intrudes on the Federal Government’s exclusive power to conduct war.