The case arose from the December 2019 drowning death of William Johnson at Cleveland's Thurgood Marshall Recreation Center. Johnson, who regularly swam at the facility, drowned during what lifeguard Nieemah Hameed described as his usual routine of swimming laps, jogging across the pool, and performing 'bobs' — going up and down while blowing bubbles underwater in the deep end. On the day of his death, Hameed chose to sit in a folding chair on the pool deck rather than an elevated 'ladder chair' because she found the lifeguard chair uncomfortable and 'a little smaller than what [she was].' Johnson's estate sued the city and lifeguard, seeking to overcome Cleveland's governmental immunity.
Writing for the court, Justice Deters rejected the estate's argument that the lifeguard's chair choice constituted a 'physical defect' that would strip Cleveland of immunity under Ohio Revised Code 2744.02(B)(4). 'The decision to use one chair rather than another plainly does not amount to a physical defect on the pool grounds,' Deters wrote, applying the 'plain, everyday meaning' of the statutory term. The court defined a 'physical defect' as 'a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of an object,' emphasizing that both chairs functioned as intended despite the lifeguard's personal preference.
The court delivered particularly sharp language in dismissing the expert testimony that formed the basis of the estate's case. The estate's aquatics expert had identified what he called 'physical defects' including the lifeguard's inability to sit comfortably in the elevated chair and a 'blind spot' created by her positioning. But Justice Deters wrote: 'a decision is not a tangible imperfection' and 'no tangible imperfection prevented the lifeguard chair from functioning as a chair.' The court emphasized that any obstruction of the lifeguard's view 'was caused not by a tangible flaw in the lifeguard chair on the pool grounds but by Hameed's decision to sit in the folding chair.'
The case reached the Supreme Court after both the trial court and the Eighth District Court of Appeals had denied Cleveland's summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues of material fact about whether a physical defect existed. The appeals court had relied heavily on its 2015 precedent in Kerber v. Cuyahoga Heights, where it similarly found that use of a low-deck lifeguard chair could create a physical defect. The Supreme Court accepted Cleveland's appeal on the narrow question of whether chair selection could constitute a physical defect under the immunity statute.
The estate had argued that the case was controlled by the court's recent plurality decision in Doe v. Greenville City Schools, where three justices concluded that the absence of safety equipment in a classroom could constitute a physical defect. But Justice Deters distinguished that case, noting not only that the lifeguard chair here was functional, but also that the Greenville plurality opinion 'garnered the votes of only three justices and so should not be relied upon' under Ohio precedent requiring four votes for controlling law. The court found 'no evidence of a tangible imperfection with respect to the lifeguard chair or pool area was presented.'
Chief Justice Kennedy wrote separately to concur, agreeing with the majority but going further to suggest the court should have overruled the Greenville decision entirely. Kennedy noted that despite Greenville's limited precedential value as a plurality opinion, lower courts have continued to cite it as persuasive authority, creating confusion. 'Because Greenville was wrongly decided, I would overrule it today and end any confusion regarding its precedential value,' Kennedy wrote. Justice Fischer concurred in judgment only without writing separately.
Justice Brunner dissented alone, arguing that genuine factual disputes remained about whether either chair constituted a physical defect. She contended that both chairs were flawed — the elevated chair was too small for the lifeguard to use comfortably, while the folding chair 'lacked appropriate dimensions to adequately function for its intended purpose' by failing to provide adequate sight lines. Brunner criticized the majority's 'excessively narrow reading' of 'physical defect,' writing that determining whether the chair arrangement qualified should be 'within the province of a jury' rather than decided as a matter of law. The court reversed the appeals court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in Cleveland's favor.