Christina Rhett, proceeding pro se, sued Commonwealth's Attorney Chris Rehak under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging he violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights during criminal proceedings by allowing perjured witness testimony, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, and permitting altered court transcripts. Rhett claimed Rehak 'unlawfully withheld exculpatory material favorable to [her] defense,' '[r]elied on a discredited informant,' and '[u]ltimately dropped the charges' against her, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief requiring Rehak to 'correct official records and prevent further misconduct.'
Judge Ballou held that Rehak was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for all the challenged conduct, writing that 'Rhett alleges misconduct in how Rehak conducted the functions associated with his office, including conducting discovery, deciding to take up and subsequently drop charges, and deciding which witnesses and evidence, whether credible or not, to present to the court.' The court found that 'Each of these factual allegations fall within the core advocacy functions of a prosecutor, protected by Imbler and its progeny.'
The judge delivered sharp criticism of Rhett's pleading, finding her allegations fundamentally deficient: 'In sum, Rhett's allegations are merely conclusory, insufficient to survive 12(b)(6), even if jurisdiction is proper.' Judge Ballou noted that while courts must liberally construe pro se complaints, 'A pro se plaintiff still must allege facts that state a cause of action.'
The case stems from criminal charges Rehak pursued against Rhett that were ultimately dropped. Rhett had initially filed both federal civil rights claims and state tort claims, but later abandoned the state-law claims. The court had previously dismissed the Virginia Attorney General's Office from the case, finding it was not a 'person' subject to suit under Section 1983.
Rhett argued that prosecutorial immunity should not apply because Rehak 'acted outside the scope of his lawful authority' and engaged in 'conduct that is investigative, administrative, or undertaken in bad faith.' But the court rejected this argument, finding no allegations that Rehak acted outside his traditional prosecutorial role. Judge Ballou explained that prosecutorial immunity covers advocacy functions such as 'initiating a prosecution' and 'presenting the State's case,' including decisions about witness testimony and evidence disclosure.
The ruling follows Supreme Court precedent from Imbler v. Pachtman, which granted prosecutors absolute immunity for actions 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Judge Ballou acknowledged that while 'this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendants without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty,' it serves important policy goals and prosecutors remain subject to 'criminal and professional sanction.'
The court dismissed the case with prejudice after finding that amendment would be futile. Rhett had requested leave to amend if the court found pleading deficiencies, but Judge Ballou noted she 'does not identify additional facts or causes of action that she would like to incorporate into this case.' The court concluded that 'there is no indication that Rhett possesses facts sufficient to overcome the scope of Rehak's prosecutorial immunity.'