Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 1 of 78 Aaron Teitelbaum (SBN 298135) 1 aaron@kressinpowers.com Andrew Chang (SBN 319009) 2 andrew@kressinpowers.com KRESSIN POWERS LLC 3 400 Seventh Avenue NW, Suite 300 Washington, DC 20004 4 Telephone: (202) 922-5962 5 Counsel for Plaintiff Aptoide, S.A. 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 CASE NO. 26-cv-3165 10 APTOIDE, S.A. COMPLAINT 11 Plaintiff, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 12 v. 13 14 GOOGLE LLC; GOOGLE IRELAND 15 LIMITED; GOOGLE COMMERCE LIMITED; GOOGLE ASIA PACIFIC PTE. 16 LIMITED; and GOOGLE PAYMENT CORP., 17 18 Defendants. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 2 of 78 Table of Contents 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ...................................................................................................... 1 2 PARTIES .......................................................................................................................................... 5 3 JURISDICTION AND VENUE ...................................................................................................... 6 4 DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENT ........................................................................................................ 8 5 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ........................................................................................................... 8 6 I. THE MERCHANT MARKET FOR MOBILE OPERATING SYSTEMS ................. 10 7 A. MARKET DEFINITION.............................................................................................. 10 8 9 1. Product Market ................................................................................................. 10 10 2. Geographic Market ........................................................................................... 11 11 B. MONOPOLY POWER ................................................................................................ 11 12 II. THE MARKETS FOR GENERAL SEARCH SERVICES AND SEARCH 13 ADVERTISING ........................................................................................................... 13 14 A. MARKET DEFINITION............................................................................................ 14 15 B. MONOPOLY POWER/MARKET POWER ............................................................. 15 16 C. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT AND EFFECTS ................................................ 16 17 III. THE ANDROID APP DISTRIBUTION MARKET .................................................... 17 18 A. MARKET DEFINITION.............................................................................................. 18 19 1. Product Market ................................................................................................. 18 20 2. Geographic Market ........................................................................................... 19 21 B. MONOPOLY POWER ................................................................................................ 20 22 C. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT.............................................................................. 21 23 1. Conduct Relating to OEMs .............................................................................. 21 24 2. Conduct Relating to Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) ............................... 24 25 3. Conduct Relating to App Developers ............................................................... 25 26 4. Conduct Relating to Competing App Stores .................................................... 31 27 28 5. Conduct Relating to App Users ........................................................................ 32 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 3 of 78 D. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS ................................................................................ 40 1 IV. THE ANDROID IN-APP BILLING MARKET .......................................................... 41 2 3 A. MARKET DEFINITION...................................................................................... 42 4 1. Product Market ........................................................................................... 42 5 2. Geographic Market ..................................................................................... 43 6 B. MONOPOLY POWER ........................................................................................ 43 7 C. ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT ...................................................................... 44 8 D. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS ......................................................................... 46 9 V. RELATED LAWSUITS BY THE UNITED STATES, STATE ATTORNEYS 10 GENERAL, AND PRIVATE PARTIES ...................................................................... 47 11 COUNT I: Sherman Act § 2 (Monopoly Maintenance in the Market for Android App 12 Distribution) ................................................................................................................................... 50 13 COUNT II: Sherman Act § 1 (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for Android App 14 Distribution Relating to OEMs) ..................................................................................................... 51 15 COUNT III: Sherman Act § 1 (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for Android App 16 Distribution Relating to the Developer Distribution Agreement) ................................................. 52 17 COUNT IV: Sherman Act § 1 (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for Android App 18 Distribution Relating to Other Agreements with Developers, Including Project Hug, the Games Velocity Program, and the Apps Velocity Program) ...................................................................... 54 19 COUNT V: Sherman Act § 1 (Reciprocal Dealing Across the Market for General Search Services 20 and the Market for Android App Distribution) ........................................................................... 55 21 COUNT VI: Sherman Act § 1 (Reciprocal Dealing Across the Market for Search Advertising and 22 the Market for Android App Distribution) ..................................................................................... 57 23 COUNT VII: Sherman Act § 2 (Monopolization and Monopoly Maintenance in the Market for 24 Android In-App Billing) ................................................................................................................. 58 25 COUNT VIII: Sherman Act § 1 (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for Android In- 26 App Billing Relating to the Developer Distribution Agreement) .................................................. 59 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 4 of 78 COUNT IX: Sherman Act § 1 (Tying Google Play Store in the Market for Android App 1 Distribution to Google Play Billing in the Market for Android In-App Billing) ........................... 61 2 COUNT X: California Cartwright Act (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for 3 Android App Distribution Relating to OEMs) ............................................................................... 62 4 COUNT XI: California Cartwright Act (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for 5 Android App Distribution Relating to the Developer Distribution Agreement) ............................ 64 6 COUNT XII: California Cartwright Act (Reciprocal Dealing Across the Market for General 7 Search Services and the Market for Android App Distribution) .................................................... 65 8 COUNT XIII: California Cartwright Act (Reciprocal Dealing Across the Market for Search 9 Advertising and the Market for Android App Distribution) .......................................................... 67 10 COUNT XIV: California Cartwright Act (Unreasonable Restraints of Trade in the Market for 11 Android In-App Billing Relating to the Developer Distribution Agreement) ............................... 69 12 COUNT XV: California Cartwright Act (Tying Google Play Store in the Market for Android App 13 Distribution to Google Play Billing in the Market for Android In-App Billing) .......................... 70 14 COUNT XVI: California Unfair Competition Law (Unlawful Conduct) ...................................... 72 15 PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................. 73 16 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ...................................................................................................... 73 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 5 of 78 1 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 2 1. App stores are the gateways to the digital mobile app economy. For billions of 3 mobile device users worldwide, app stores determine which apps a user can discover, the means 4 through which developers and users transact, and ultimately, which apps succeed or fail. In short, 5 app stores control the commercial relationship between developers and users. Control over that 6 infrastructure determines whether competition in the mobile app ecosystem can occur at all. 7 2. After 15 days of trial in Epic Games, Inc. v. Google LLC (“Epic v. Google”), a jury 8 found that there is a relevant market for Android App Distribution, and that Google willfully 9 acquired or maintained monopoly power in that market by engaging in anticompetitive conduct. 10 Both the District Court judge overseeing the trial and the Ninth Circuit upheld the jury’s verdict. 11 See In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., 2024 WL 3302068, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2024); In 12 re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., 147 F. 4th 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2025). 13 3. Google’s dominant position in the Android App Distribution market—a monopoly 14 share of over 90% protected by significant barriers to entry, according to data through 2022—was 15 not the result of competition on the merits. It arose from Google’s deliberate, multi-pronged strategy 16 to maintain its monopoly over this critical gateway, suppress rival app stores, and extract 17 supracompetitive fees from developers and users. See ECF No. 606, In re Google Play Store 18 Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Cal. No. 20-cv-05671) (“Epic Verdict Sheet”), at 2-3. 19 4. Google attacked competition at every level of the Android ecosystem. Google used 20 Mobile Application Distribution Agreements (“MADAs”) and Revenue Sharing Agreements 21 (“RSAs”) with manufacturers of Android phones to secure preferential placement for Google Play 22 and punish any attempts to give its competitors comparable treatment—conduct which, according 23 to data obtained by the Competition & Markets Authority as well as the Google Search remedies- 24 phase record, continued through at least 2024. It reinforced those restrictions through side deals 25 with major app developers designed to keep them in the Play ecosystem and prevent rival stores 26 from gaining traction. It raised technical and contractual barriers that continue today to prevent rival 27 app stores from achieving meaningful distribution on Android devices. And it deliberately 28 engineered the user experience of installing apps from outside Google Play to be onerous and often PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 1
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 6 of 78 1 prohibitive, forcing users still today to overcome numerous warning screens, security prompts, and 2 multi-step hurdles before downloading an app through a competing channel. 3 5. Not content with maintaining its monopoly in the market for Android App 4 Distribution, Google used its dominance in that market to acquire and maintain a monopoly in a 5 separate market for in-app billing services for apps in the Android ecosystem. Until at least 2025, 6 Google conditioned developers’ access to the Google Play Store on their exclusive use of Google’s 7 proprietary in-app billing system, Google Play Billing. Google’s coercive policies insulated Google 8 Play Billing from price and quality competition and allowed Google to impose supracompetitive 9 prices that developers could not avoid without losing access to Android users altogether. Presented 10 with this evidence, the Epic v. Google jury likewise found—and the Ninth Circuit likewise 11 affirmed—that there exists a relevant market for Android In-App Billing Services for Digital 12 Goods and Services Transactions (the “Android In-App Billing Market”), and that Google 13 willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in that market by engaging in anticompetitive 14 conduct. See Epic Verdict Sheet at 2-3. 15 6. Google’s unlawful monopolies in the Android App Distribution Market and in the 16 Android In-App Billing Market did not arise in isolation. Those monopolies are flanked by Google’s 17 adjacent monopoly in the market for General Search Services, which was found after a trial lasting 18 over two months to be a relevant market in which Google had monopoly power and engaged in 19 anticompetitive conduct. See United States v. Google LLC, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1, 118, 136 (D.D.C. 20 2024) (“Google Search”). Google used its mutually-reinforcing monopoly in this market to secure 21 its dominant position in the markets for Android App Distribution and Android In-App Billing in at 22 least two ways. 23 7. First, as discussed above, Google entered into MADAs and RSAs with every major 24 manufacturer of Android phones, offering them extortionately lucrative shares of its monopoly 25 profits in the General Search Services market in exchange for their agreement to preference the 26 Google Play Store over competing app stores. In Google Search, the district court found that the 27 MADAs and RSAs were anticompetitive agreements to maintain Google’s general-search 28 monopoly because they required manufacturers to preinstall Google Search as the default search PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 2
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 7 of 78 1 engine for those devices’ search access points. 747 F. Supp. 3d at 99-100. In Epic v. Google, those 2 very same agreements were determined to serve a dual purpose in the Android App Distribution 3 market: not only did they require preinstallation and preferencing of the Google Play Store, but 4 Google was able to use the monopoly profits it generated from its Google Search business to buy 5 off Android device manufacturers so they would refuse Google’s app-store competitors comparable 6 treatment. 7 8. Second, knowing that it held a monopoly product in the General Search Services 8 market, Google conditioned app developers’ ability to advertise their apps through one-tap 9 installations on the Google Search results page on those developers distributing their apps through 10 the Google Play Store. For example, because apps like Spotify are distributed through Google Play, 11 a user searching for the “Spotify” app on Google Search can download that app from Google Play 12 by simply tapping an icon on the search results page. But if Spotify were to instead distribute its 13 app through a competing app store, a user searching for “Spotify” on Google Search would see 14 nothing but a link to the Spotify website. In sum, app developers may either distribute their apps 15 through Google Play in order to access the vast audience of Android users searching for apps through 16 Google Search, or distribute elsewhere and forego any meaningful visibility to those users. 17 9. None of this is defensible as competition on the merits. There is no procompetitive 18 rationale for Google’s use of monopoly profits from its Search monopoly to purchase Android 19 manufacturers’ compliance, conditioning critical revenue streams on the preloading and preferential 20 placement of Google Play. Nor is there any justification for Google’s self-preferencing of Google 21 Play on Google Search, forcing app developers to either distribute through Google Play or give up 22 the ability to convert users of Google’s monopoly general-search product through streamlined one- 23 tap downloads. This scheme does not improve products, reduce costs, or create efficiencies that 24 benefit customers. It exists to protect and extend Google’s monopoly power across adjacent markets 25 by suppressing distribution alternatives and insulating Google Play from competitive pressure. 26 10. This case sits at the heart of this interrelated web of adjacent monopolies, each of 27 which Google was found to have unlawfully acquired or maintained. Plaintiff Aptoide, S.A. 28 (“Aptoide”) is the world’s leading independent Android app store. Notwithstanding Google’s PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 3
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 8 of 78 1 anticompetitive chokehold over the Android App Distribution and Android In-App Billing Markets, 2 Aptoide has managed to build one of the most successful and fastest-growing app distribution 3 platforms globally, particularly in the distribution of mobile games. Founded in 2011, Aptoide 4 reached its first million users in 2013; by 2024, only a decade later, it had reached over 200 million 5 direct yearly users. Aptoide is presently the third-largest Android store in the world, with a catalog 6 of approximately 436,000 unique apps. 7 11. For over a decade, Aptoide has provided users and developers a genuine competitive 8 alternative to Google Play and Google Play Billing. It offers developers lower commissions, users 9 lower payment costs, and app users across the ecosystem greater consumer choice. Aptoide has 10 over 10 partner stores globally and has built an extensive content-delivery-network infrastructure 11 around the world to optimize fast, secure downloads for users across multiple countries. It also has 12 partnerships and connections with major U.S. network carriers (such as AT&T, Verizon, and T- 13 Mobile), through which it has been able to achieve success in reaching users at the point of mobile- 14 device purchase. 15 12. Aptoide has demonstrated both the incentive and the capability to compete with 16 Google on the merits. But for Google’s monopolies in the Android App Distribution and Android 17 In-App Billing Markets—and the exclusionary practices Google uses to protect them—Aptoide 18 would have exerted substantially more competitive pressure on Google’s pricing and policies. 19 Instead, Google successfully suppressed that competition, foreclosing Aptoide from crucial access 20 channels at the outset and preventing it from realizing the benefits of fair competition that the 21 antitrust laws are designed to protect. 22 13. Aptoide thus brings claims under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as well as 23 under California’s Cartwright Act and Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), to challenge Google’s 24 unlawful agreements within, and monopolization of, two key Android commerce channels: (i) the 25 Android App Distribution Market, and (ii) the Android In-App Billing Market. Aptoide seeks 26 damages and injunctive relief necessary to dismantle the restraints that insulate Google Play and 27 Google Play Billing from competitive pressure and end Google’s scheme to control how Android 28 users discover, download, and pay for apps. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 4
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 9 of 78 1 PARTIES 2 14. Plaintiff Aptoide, S.A., is a company incorporated in Portugal with its principal 3 place of business in Lisbon, Portugal. Founded in 2011, Aptoide operates an independent app 4 distribution platform—the Aptoide Store—that allows Android users to discover and download 5 mobile applications. Aptoide also offers in-app payment solutions that allow developers to monetize 6 Android apps distributed through Aptoide. Aptoide has since grown into one of the largest 7 competitors to the Google Play Store, reporting a global user base exceeding 200 million direct 8 yearly users and an app catalog of approximately 436,000 unique apps. 9 15. Defendant Google LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal 10 place of business in Mountain View, California. Google LLC is the primary operating subsidiary 11 of the publicly traded holding company Alphabet Inc. The sole member of Google LLC is XXVI 12 Holdings, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, 13 California. Google LLC contracts with all app developers that distribute their apps through the 14 Google Play Store and therefore is a party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in 15 this Complaint. 16 16. Defendant Google Ireland Limited (“Google Ireland”) is a limited company 17 organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland, and a 18 subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Ireland contracts with all app developers that distribute their 19 apps through the Google Play Store and is therefore a party to the anticompetitive contractual 20 restrictions at issue in this Complaint. 21 17. Defendant Google Commerce Limited (“Google Commerce”) is a limited company 22 organized under the laws of Ireland with its principal place of business in Dublin, Ireland, and a 23 subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Commerce contracts with all app developers that distribute their 24 apps through the Google Play Store and is therefore a party to the anticompetitive contractual 25 restrictions at issue in this Complaint. 26 18. Defendant Google Asia Pacific Pte. Limited (“Google Asia Pacific”) is a private 27 limited company organized under the laws of Singapore with its principal place of business in 28 Mapletree Business City, Singapore, and a subsidiary of Google LLC. Google Asia Pacific contracts PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 5
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 10 of 78 1 with all app developers that distribute their apps through the Google Play Store and is therefore a 2 party to the anticompetitive contractual restrictions at issue in this Complaint. 3 19. Defendant Google Payment Corp. (“Google Payment”) is a Delaware corporation 4 with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California, and a subsidiary of Google LLC. 5 Google Payment provides in-app payment processing services to Android app developers and 6 Android users and, as of the date of this filing, collects a 30% commission on many types of 7 processed payments, including payments for apps sold through the Google Play Store and in-app 8 purchases made within such apps. 9 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10 20. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Aptoide’s federal antitrust claims 11 pursuant to the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 and 26, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337. 12 The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Aptoide’s state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 13 § 1367. The Court also has subject-matter jurisdiction over the state-law claims pursuant to 28 14 U.S.C. § 1332 based on the diversity of citizenships of Plaintiff, on the one hand, and of Defendants, 15 on the other, and the amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. 16 21. This Court has personal jurisdiction over each of the Defendants. Google LLC and 17 Google Payment are headquartered in this District. All Defendants have engaged in sufficient 18 minimum contacts with the United States and have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits 19 and protections of United States and California law, such that the exercise of jurisdiction over them 20 would comport with due process requirements. 21 22. The Defendants also have consented to this Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. 22 Each of the Defendants except Google Payment is a party to the Google Play Developer Distribution 23 Agreement (the “DDA”) that sets forth the terms and conditions under which developers may list 24 their apps on Google Play. According to the current version of the DDA published by Google on 25 its website (dated September 2025), Section 16.8 provides that the parties will “agree to submit to 26 the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal or state courts located within the county of Santa Clara, 27 California to resolve any legal matter arising from or relating to this Agreement.” Section 16.8 28 further provides that “[a]ll claims arising out of or relating to this Agreement or Your relationship PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 6
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 11 of 78 1 with Google under this Agreement will by governed by the laws of the State of California, excluding 2 California’s conflict of laws provisions.” The claims addressed in this Complaint relate to the DDA 3 and its impacts on Aptoide as a competing app store, or in the alternative, such claims arise out of 4 the same nucleus of operative facts as other claims as to which the Court may exercise personal 5 jurisdiction over each Defendant, so that the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction would be 6 proper. 7 23. Google Payment is a party to the Google Payment—Terms of Service—Seller 8 Agreement, which sets forth the terms and conditions under which developers use Google Play’s in- 9 app billing services. According to the most recent public version of this agreement published by 10 Google on its website (dated March 2023), Section 11.3 provides that “[t]he exclusive venue for any 11 dispute related to this Agreement will be the state or federal courts located in Santa Clara County, 12 California, and each party consents to personal jurisdiction in these courts.” Section 11.3 further 13 provides that “[t]he laws of California, excluding California’s choice of law rules, and applicable 14 federal United States laws will govern this Agreement.” The dispute between Google Payment and 15 Aptoide relates to the impact of the Google Payment Seller Agreement on Aptoide, or in the 16 alternative, Aptoide’s claims arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as other claims as to 17 which the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Google Payment, so that the exercise of 18 pendent personal jurisdiction would be proper. 19 24. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Google 20 LLC and Google Payment maintain their principal places of business in the State of California and 21 in this District, because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Aptoide’s claims 22 occurred in this District, and because, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3), any Defendants not 23 resident in the United States may be sued in any judicial district and their joinder with others shall 24 be disregarded in determining proper venue. In the alternative, personal jurisdiction and venue also 25 may be deemed proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, because 26 Defendants may be found in or transact business in this District. 27 28 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 7
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 12 of 78 1 DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENT 2 25. Civil Local Rule 3-2(c) does not provide the basis for assignment to a particular 3 Division of this District. However, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 3-12(a)(1)-(2), this case is related 4 to Epic v. Google (N.D. Cal. No. 3:20-cv-5671-JD), which was consolidated into In re Google Play 5 Store Antitrust Litigation (N.D. Cal. No. 3:21-md-2981-JD), because it concerns substantially the 6 same parties, property, transactions, or events, and there will be an unduly burdensome duplication 7 of labor and expense or conflicting results if this case is conducted before a different judge. 8 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 9 26. Plaintiff Aptoide, S.A. is a Portuguese public limited company headquartered in 10 Lisbon, Portugal. Founded in 2011, Aptoide provides consumers and developers alike a meaningful 11 alternative to dominant, closed app store ecosystems. Aptoide’s flagship product is the Aptoide 12 Store, a free and independent app distribution platform for Android that allows users to not only 13 download and install apps, but also to operate their own app stores. 14 27. An “independent” app store is an app distribution platform that is not controlled by 15 an upstream firm in the mobile ecosystem—e.g., the Samsung Galaxy Store (which is controlled by 16 Samsung, an Android device manufacturer), the Verizon App Manager (which is controlled by 17 Verizon, a wireless carrier), or Google Play (which is controlled by Google, who owns the Android 18 OS). Because non-independent app stores are controlled by firms that also compete with app 19 developers (for example, Google distributes YouTube, which competes with other video-sharing 20 apps, within Google Play) and thus profit from steering users toward their own apps and services, 21 they often have incentives to impose restrictive distribution terms for the apps they do not own. 22 Independent app stores lack those adverse incentives. Their success depends on attracting 23 developers and users by offering competitive pricing, fair terms of distribution, flexibility in 24 payment processing, and broader choice. In other words, their interests are aligned with those of 25 developers seeking open access to users, and users seeking greater innovation and lower prices. 26 28. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, developers and industry observers increasingly 27 recognized that apps distributed through vertically-integrated app stores (like Google Play) faced 28 significant visibility issues, especially when they competed with the store operator’s own proprietary PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 8
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 13 of 78 1 apps. Aptoide was created to meet the growing demand for a legitimate alternative distribution 2 channel. In 2009, two years before its incorporation, Aptoide launched an open-source version of 3 what would become the Aptoide Store, reflecting its early commitment to independent competition 4 in mobile app distribution. Since then, Aptoide has become the fastest-growing app distribution 5 platform in the world, serving more than 200 million direct yearly users worldwide and hosting a 6 robust app catalog of approximately 436,000 unique apps with over 7 billion historical downloads 7 in total. Aptoide has a substantial presence in the United States, generating approximately $18.5 8 million in U.S. revenue in 2025 from a domestic userbase of nearly a million monthly active users. 9 29. Aptoide provides a suite of products designed to broaden distribution options and 10 reduce the costs imposed by dominant platforms. For example, in addition to the user-facing 11 Aptoide Store, Aptoide also offers Aptoide Connect (formerly “Catappult”), the developer-facing 12 side of the Aptoide Store that enables developers to integrate and monetize their apps across the 13 Aptoide Store and over 10 partner app stores. 14 30. Aptoide Connect includes an in-app billing solution supporting a wide array of 15 payment methods for in-app transactions, including credit card, Amazon Pay, PayPal, and local 16 payment options tailored to specific regions. Aptoide Connect offers developers the industry’s most 17 favorable revenue splits on these transactions, permitting them to keep up to 90% of the revenue for 18 in-app purchases processed through Aptoide’s in-app billing software. 19 31. Aptoide also offers the Aptoide Wallet (formerly “AppCoins”), a separate 20 application and web interface integrated with its in-app billing software that offers users discounts 21 of up to 20% on in-app purchases. Users of the Aptoide Wallet are able to utilize multiple payment 22 options to store a balance usable across various mobile games and applications. 23 32. In 2024, Aptoide launched in Europe the first alternative app store and in-app 24 payment solution for Apple’s iOS, the operating system on which Apple’s iPhones run. That launch 25 followed Apple’s implementation of changes required by the European Union’s Digital Markets Act 26 (“DMA”), which requires designated platform “gatekeepers” to, inter alia, (i) permit and technically 27 enable the installation of third-party apps and third-party app stores; and (ii) allow the use of 28 alternative payment solutions for in-app purchases. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 9
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 14 of 78 1 I. THE MERCHANT MARKET FOR MOBILE OPERATING SYSTEMS 2 33. Google’s dominance in the Android App Distribution and Android In-App Billing 3 Markets (together, the “Android Markets”), discussed infra in Parts III and IV, is rooted in its 4 dominance in an adjacent market: the Merchant Market for Mobile Operating Systems (“OSs”). 5 Although Aptoide’s claims are directed at Google’s anticompetitive conduct in the Android App 6 Distribution and Android In-App Billing Markets, the foundational role that operating systems play 7 in the smart mobile device ecosystem lends key context to the monopolies Google illegally acquired 8 and maintained in those two markets. 9 A. MARKET DEFINITION 10 1. Product Market 11 34. Modern smartphones and tablets (“smart mobile devices”) are general-purpose 12 computing devices. They deliver core functionality—communications, navigation, entertainment, 13 and commerce—through software applications that run on top of an operating system, or OS. 14 Without a mobile OS, a smart mobile device is not meaningfully usable. The OS supplies the basic 15 interface and controls, manages the device’s connectivity and hardware features, and enables the 16 installation and operation of mobile apps compatible with that OS. 17 35. Smart mobile devices are manufactured by original equipment manufacturers 18 (“OEMs”) like Samsung, LG, Motorola, and Nokia. In order to be able to sell smart mobile devices 19 that are usable by customers immediately after purchase, OEMs must pre-install OSs on each device 20 they manufacture prior to sale. And, because OEMs must pre-install OSs on each device, OEMs 21 design mobile devices to ensure the device’s compatibility with a particular OS the OEM chooses 22 for a particular model of mobile device, so that the device may utilize the capabilities of that OS. 23 Designing smartphones to be compatible with a particular OS—including engineering, integrating, 24 and preinstalling that OS before sale—requires significant time and investment. An OEM cannot 25 easily switch the OS of a given model of smart mobile device without incurring prohibitively large 26 switching costs. 27 36. The vast majority of OEMs do not and cannot develop their own mobile OSs. 28 Creating a mobile OS from scratch requires enormous and sustained investment in engineering and PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 10
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 15 of 78 1 long-term maintenance across a wide range of device configurations. A viable mobile OS must also 2 include core functionality and compatibility layers that allow third-party apps to run reliably, and it 3 must be updated continuously to keep pace with evolving hardware and security threats. Thus, 4 building and maintaining a competitive mobile OS is not economically feasible for most OEMs. 5 37. As a result, most OEMs must license a mobile operating system that can be 6 preinstalled on the smart mobile devices they manufacture and sell. There thus exists a relevant 7 Merchant Market for Mobile OSs in which the developers of mobile OSs are the sellers of OS 8 licenses, and OEMs are buyers of those licenses. Historically, the Merchant Market for Mobile OSs 9 has included the Android OS (developed by Google), the Tizen OS (developed by Samsung and 10 hosted by the Linux Foundation), and the Windows Mobile OS/Windows Phone OS (developed by 11 Microsoft). Companies that produce OSs that they use only for their own proprietary hardware— 12 e.g., Apple’s iOS, available only on Apple’s iPhones—do not participate in this market because they 13 do not sell licenses to OEMs. 14 2. Geographic Market 15 38. OEMs license mobile operating systems on a worldwide basis, except in China. 16 Google’s operations in China are limited, and many of Google’s mobile products and services are 17 not offered there. Those limitations reflect legal and regulatory restrictions imposed by China on 18 mobile-OS-related software. Moreover, although Google requires OEMs licensing Android for sale 19 outside China to refrain from selling devices using competing Android-compatible mobile OSs, 20 Google does not impose that same restriction on devices sold within China. The geographic scope 21 of the Merchant Market for Mobile OSs is therefore worldwide, excluding China. 22 B. MONOPOLY POWER 23 39. Google has monopoly power in the Merchant Market for Mobile OSs. Google’s 24 monopoly power in this market is apparent both indirectly through its dominant market share 25 protected by significant barriers to entry, and directly through its power to impose draconian, 26 lopsided requirements on licensee OEMs without regard to competitive responses by other OS 27 licensors. 28 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 11
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 16 of 78 1 40. As the European Commission determined in the course of its 2018 investigation into 2 Android, the Android OS (which Google licenses to OEMs) comes pre-installed on over 90% of all 3 mobile devices sold by OEMs that license a third-party OS. Even including OEMs like Apple that 4 do not license third-party OSs—and thus are not properly considered participants in the Licensing 5 Market for Mobile OSs—Google’s Android OS has a 75% market share of devices sold worldwide, 6 excluding China. 7 41. Google’s dominant market share is protected by significant barriers to entry. The 8 Android OS benefits from substantial network effects. Because devices, apps, and accessories must 9 be designed to be compatible with a specific mobile OS, the Android OS has its own ecosystem of 10 interdependent mobile products and apps that are designed to be usable only on Android. By 11 contrast, a new mobile OS entrant must attract consumers to a device platform that initially lacks a 12 robust app library (as well as hardware and accessories), while simultaneously persuading software 13 and hardware developers to build, adapt, and maintain products for a platform that initially has few 14 users. This chicken-and-egg problem—recognized in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 15 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) as the “applications barrier to entry” into operating-systems markets—makes 16 entry extremely difficult even for well-funded firms, because developers rationally prioritize 17 platforms with large user bases, and users rationally choose platforms with the widest selection of 18 apps and accessories. 19 42. There likewise exists direct evidence of Google’s monopoly power in the Merchant 20 Market for Mobile OSs. Google imposes stringent terms in its licensing agreements with OEMs 21 that require, inter alia, that OEMs licensing the Android OS pre-install and preference the Google 22 Play Store over other app stores. All of Google’s apps (e.g., Gmail, Google Maps, YouTube, the 23 Google Search Widget, and the Google Play Store) must be licensed as a bundle, meaning that an 24 OEM cannot pre-install any Google apps without also pre-installing and preferencing all the others. 25 Despite Google’s uniform imposition of this term—which precludes OEMs from entering into 26 potentially lucrative deals with competing app stores allowing such stores to secure competitive 27 default placements—several OEMs have nevertheless stated that other OSs are not a reasonable 28 alternative to the Android OS. As they explain, other mobile OSs lack the existing catalog of high- PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 12
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 17 of 78 1 quality and successful mobile apps available on Android, which consumers find invaluable in 2 selecting a mobile device to purchase. In other words, Google’s licensing terms with OEMs 3 represent conduct in which only a monopolist could engage. 4 43. Similarly, Google has entered into so-called Anti-Fragmentation Agreements 5 (“AFAs”) and Android Compatibility Commitments (“ACCs”) with OEMs licensing the Android 6 OS. The Android OS is nominally “open source,” meaning that the Android codebase is publicly 7 available for others to view, use, and modify. But the AFAs and ACCs prohibit those OEMs from 8 creating and selling “forks” of the Android OS—i.e., versions of Android derived from Android’s 9 open-source codebase but modified, developed, and distributed by third parties rather than Google— 10 that might permit those OEMs to circumvent Google’s self-preferencing requirements. Entering 11 into an AFA or ACC is a precondition to an OEM being able to enter into a Mobile Application 12 Distribution Agreement (“MADA”) and Revenue Sharing Agreement (“RSA”), which, as discussed 13 infra in Parts II and III, are commercially indispensable to OEMs. This, too, is something only a 14 monopolist could force its customers to do without fear of losing market share to its competitors. 15 44. This conduct also creates a further barrier to entry in the Merchant Market for 16 Mobile OSs by restricting the ability of OEMs to support alternatives to Google’s version of Android 17 and making it more difficult for consumers to switch to other mobile OSs. 18 II. THE MARKETS FOR GENERAL SEARCH SERVICES AND SEARCH 19 ADVERTISING 20 45. Google’s dominance in the Android Markets should also be considered against the 21 backdrop of its dominance in two other markets: the market for General Search Services and the 22 related market for Search Advertising. 23 46. In the mid-2000s, the emergence of modern smartphones marked a paradigm shift 24 in computing, as consumers increasingly accessed the Internet and digital services through mobile 25 platforms rather than traditional desktop computers. Recognizing that the mobile ecosystem 26 threatened to disrupt and redirect attention away from the web-based pathways that fueled Google’s 27 then-core business, Google moved aggressively to ensure that it could control the next generation 28 of computing. As discussed infra in Parts III and IV, Google’s monopolization of the Android PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 13
Case 3:26-cv-03165-SVK Document 1 Filed 04/14/26 Page 18 of 78 1 Markets was the intended result of a decades-long strategy in which Google sought to use its existing 2 dominance in general search—and, corollary to that dominance, the enormous value of advertising 3 to Google’s general search userbase—to secure default distribution and preferencing for the Google 4 Play Store, and by extension, Google Play Billing. 5 A. MARKET DEFINITION 6 47. General Search Services. A general search engine (“GSE”) is a tool to search the 7 worldwide web using queries. GSEs attempt to answer all queries by providing search results that 8 are relevant to those queries. Unlike specialized or “vertical” search tools that return results from a 9 narrow category (such as shopping, restaurants, videos, or searches limited to a single app), GSEs 10 are designed to answer a broad range of queries by searching across a wide portion of the Internet 11 and presenting results to users in a ranked list. 12 48. As the district court found in Google Search, there exists a relevant market for 13 General Search Services in the United States. In this market, GSEs (like Google, Bing, and 14 DuckDuckGo) compete to provide responses to general-search queries from users. Alternative 15 sources of query information, like “vertical” search tools and social media sites, are not reasonably 16 interchangeable with general search services because general search services have peculiar 17 characteristics and uses; are recognized in the industry as a distinct product for which other sources 18 of query information are not reasonable substitutes; and require unique production facilities. 19 49. Search Advertising. Beyond their informational function, search engines that 20 return information in response to user queries are invaluable advertising opportunities for goods and 21 services sellers. For instance, when a user searches for “Bluetooth speakers” on Google Search, the 22 search results page contains not only links relevant to the user’s query, but advertisements as well, 23 potentially including text advertisements, product listing advertisements, or even advertisements for 24 audio-focused mobile apps. Unlike other forms of advertising, search advertising offers advertisers 25 the chance to respond to real-time, expressed intent discernable from a user’s query; for example, a 26 user who looks up “Bluetooth speakers” is more likely to be interested in purchasing Bluetooth 27 speakers than the average viewer of a non-targeted ad. 28 PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 14