Yerano Martinez collided with a truck after driving through a stop sign on Halloween Day 2019 at an intersection in Miami County, sustaining serious injuries when the stop sign was allegedly obscured by an overgrown bush on Jeffrey Smith's property that extended partially into the county's right-of-way. Martinez sued Smith, arguing he failed to maintain his property to prevent obstructions to the traffic control device, while Smith moved for summary judgment claiming he owed no duty because the bush didn't intrude upon the roadway itself.
The Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Smith, clarifying that the common-law duty established in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats encompasses more than just the paved road surface. As Justice Goff wrote, 'we hold that the common-law duty under Reece to refrain from creating hazardous conditions encompasses not just the paved portion of the roadway but also traffic-control devices within the public right-of-way.' The Court emphasized that 'a stop sign, like any traffic-control device, is an integral part of the roadway' because the motoring public's ability to navigate depends on more than just the road surface.
In forceful language, Justice Goff rejected Smith's theory that would allow landowners to obstruct traffic signs without consequence: 'Under Smith's theory, a landowner, without consequence, could build a wall that obscures the view of a stop sign so long as that wall doesn't encroach upon the surface of the roadway. But our common law says otherwise.' The Court noted that Smith himself acknowledged the bush trunk fell within the county right-of-way, meaning the condition was not 'wholly contained' on his property.
The trial court had granted summary judgment for Smith after concluding that Reece 'did not extend' the landowner's duty to the public right-of-way, distinguishing between 'a right of way and a roadway.' Judge John M.T. Chavis II of Marion Superior Court sided with Smith's argument that he owed no duty under Reece because the bush didn't intrude upon the roadway. The Indiana Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed in 2024, with Judge Weissmann's panel holding that finding a duty would 'improperly expand the rule in Reece.'
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning that Reece intended to use 'roadway' and 'public right of way' synonymously only to refer to the road surface. Justice Goff explained that while the Court agreed these terms were used synonymously in Reece, 'we reject the idea that either term is necessarily confined to the paved portion or surface of the road.' The opinion cited common-law precedent holding it 'unlawful' to place anything in a public highway that 'impedes or endangers public travel' across 'the whole width of the highway, and not merely to a worn portion of it commonly used for passage.'
Justice Slaughter dissented, arguing the majority 'undermines Reece's bright-line rule' and relies on 'stale case law, irrelevant dictionary definitions, and inapposite statutes.' Slaughter criticized the Court for barely mentioning Reece while deriving its understanding from 'three obscure court of appeals' opinions, the most recent of which is fifty years old.' He argued that Reece and underlying precedent 'all contemplated a duty only where hazards existed on the traveled roadway.'
Justice Molter concurred separately, joined by Chief Justice Rush on Parts II-IV, arguing the decision reflects sound law-and-economics principles. Molter wrote that 'the burden of keeping the public right-of-way clear of obstructions in front of traffic signs is not meaningfully more onerous than keeping the area over the asphalt clear of obstructions.' He noted the General Assembly already imposes similar obligations on landowners to keep right-of-way clear of visual obstructions to traffic signals.