Key Points

  • The Ninth Circuit held that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching a felony warrant suspect with guns drawn and pointed at his head from ten to twenty feet away.
  • The panel found the officers reasonably believed Medrano had committed serious offenses, posed a safety threat, and might flee based on his recent evasion of police.
  • Judge Paez dissented on the constitutional question, arguing a jury could find it unreasonable to keep guns trained on a compliant suspect's head at close range.
  • The panel unanimously agreed the right was not clearly established, as prior precedent involved different circumstances including misdemeanor investigations.
  • The majority chose to resolve the constitutional merits rather than deciding on clearly-established grounds alone — a sequencing choice Judge Paez criticized as unnecessary.

The Ninth Circuit reversed a lower court's denial of qualified immunity to two Bell Gardens police officers who pointed their weapons at a man's head while arresting him on what they believed was an active felony warrant, holding that their use of force did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The decision, issued September 25, split 2-1, with Judge Richard Paez dissenting on whether the officers' conduct was constitutional while agreeing that the law was not clearly established.

Officers Acosta and Roberts approached Alex Medrano on June 8, 2018, in his father's backyard after receiving reports he was there. From ten to twenty feet away, they drew their weapons and aimed at Medrano, commanding him to climb a six-foot fence to reach them. Medrano, who alleged both officers pointed guns at his head, complied without incident and was immediately handcuffed.

The officers believed Medrano had an active federal no-bail warrant for methamphetamine distribution and had recently fled from a separate traffic stop. Unknown to them, a federal magistrate judge had recalled the warrant three days earlier, but California's law enforcement database had not been updated. Medrano was held for three days before being released when the error was discovered.

Writing for the court, Judge Consuelo Callahan held that the officers reasonably believed Medrano "may have committed multiple serious offenses, posed a threat to their safety, and was actively on the run from a felony arrest warrant and may again attempt to flee." Judge Patrick Bumatay joined the opinion.

The officers conceded that "pointing guns at a suspect is deemed a high level of force" under circuit precedent. But Judge Callahan found the government's interests outweighed the intrusion. The officers knew Medrano had evaded police during a traffic stop roughly two weeks earlier. His mother had called police the following day after he began "acting paranoid and spray painting 'the federal police [a]re out to get me' inside the interior" of a residence. Officers believed he was affiliated with a local street gang.

An officer's "right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it," the majority wrote, quoting the Supreme Court's Graham v. Connor decision. When officers "execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm," the Fourth Amendment is not violated.

The panel also addressed whether, assuming a constitutional violation occurred, the right was clearly established. Medrano argued that the Ninth Circuit's 2002 en banc decision in Robinson v. Solano County provided clear notice that the officers' conduct was unlawful. In Robinson, the court held that officers used excessive force when they pointed guns at a 64-year-old retired police officer, from point-blank range, whose hands were already raised.

Judge Callahan distinguished the case. The officers in Robinson, she wrote, "did not believe that they were making a felony arrest but were 'investigating a mere misdemeanor.'" There, officers needlessly "terrorize[d]" the plaintiff by pointing their firearms at him from point-blank range despite his compliance. By contrast, the officers here reasonably believed they were executing a felony arrest against someone who had recently fled police and might do so again.

Judge Paez concurred that the law was not clearly established but "respectfully" dissented from the constitutional holding. He criticized the majority for reaching the merits at all, writing that doing so ran "counter to the older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable," quoting Pearson v. Callahan.

The dissent argued that the majority improperly drew factual inferences against Medrano at the summary judgment stage. "When all disputes of fact are resolved in [Medrano's] favor," Judge Paez wrote, quoting Chew v. Gates, "it is apparent that application of the Graham factors would not have required a rational jury to decide that [aiming two guns at his head] to apprehend him was reasonable."

Judge Paez pointed to several facts the majority discounted. Medrano was "compliant" and "outnumbered," with five additional officers surrounding the home. The prior incidents the officers relied upon were "stale and nonviolent" — skipping a hearing and fleeing a traffic stop "does not necessarily make one more likely to violently resist arrest," he wrote. The dog in the backyard posed no threat because a fence separated it from the officers.

The dissent faulted the majority for not addressing Medrano's argument that the officers had a less intrusive alternative available: holding their firearms in the "low-ready position" — pointed at the ground rather than at his head. Bell Gardens Police Department's own policy manual instructs that "[i]f the officer does not initially perceive a threat but reasonably believes that the potential for such threat exists, firearms should generally be kept in the low-ready position."

"A jury could conclude that it was no longer objectively reasonable to keep two guns trained on Medrano's head, rather than at the ground away from him, once he was closer and compliant," Judge Paez wrote.

The dissent also criticized the majority's treatment of warnings. The majority had written that the officers' drawn weapons themselves "served as a warning" to secure compliance. Judge Paez called this reasoning "seriously wrong," noting that under circuit precedent, "aiming a loaded gun at a suspect is not the threat of force, it is force." He accused the majority of reviving reasoning from a dissent that was "at odds with twenty-five years of law in this circuit."

Medrano filed his pro se civil rights complaint in December 2018, roughly six months after his arrest. The case proceeded through preliminary litigation before he filed an operative complaint in July 2022 with claims against the officers under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. A magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to the officers, but District Judge Maame Ewusi-Mensah Frimpong rejected that recommendation, finding that a juror could conclude both officers pointed their guns at Medrano's head and that "such action was a clear violation of an established constitutional right."

The officers appealed. The Ninth Circuit thanked appointed pro bono counsel for Medrano — certified law students Carlos Fairbanks and Victor Bao, supervised by Peter Afrasiabi of One LLP — for their service. The officers were represented by Daniel Barer and Karen Stepanyan of Pollak Vida & Barer, along with Scott Carpenter of Carpenter Rothans & Dumont. Lead counsel included Daniel P. Barer of Pollak Vida & Barer for the officers and Carlos Fairbanks of One LLP for Medrano.

The case now returns to the Central District of California with instructions to enter judgment for the officers on the excessive force claim.