Key Points

  • The court reversed the $8.2 million verdict and directed judgment for Senate Majority PAC.
  • A public-figure plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.
  • Defamation-by-implication claims require proof of intent or recklessness as to the claimed implication.
  • Disbelief of defense witnesses and an ad’s possible meaning did not establish actual malice.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed an $8.2 million verdict for Roy Moore against Senate Majority PAC and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the PAC. The court concluded that Moore, a public figure, had not proved actual malice by clear and convincing evidence on his Alabama-law defamation and false-light claims.

The case arose from a 2017 campaign ad that used consecutive frames stating that Moore had been banned from the Gadsden Mall “for soliciting sex from young girls” and that one person he approached “was 14 and working as Santa’s helper.” Moore alleged that the juxtaposition conveyed a false implication that he had solicited sex from the 14-year-old girl.

A jury found Senate Majority PAC liable for defamation and false-light invasion of privacy and awarded compensatory damages. The district court denied the PAC’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and its motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit independently reviewed whether the record established actual malice with the constitutionally required level of proof.

The court said the case involved the heightened First Amendment standard applicable to a public-figure plaintiff and speech concerning a political candidate. Actual malice turns on the publisher’s subjective state of mind: whether it knew a statement was false or entertained serious doubts about its truth. “The test is not an objective one and the beliefs or actions of a reasonable person are irrelevant.”

For defamation by implication, the panel held that proof of falsity alone does not establish the required intent to defame. A plaintiff also must prove that the defendant intended to communicate the asserted defamatory meaning or recklessly disregarded that meaning. The court described the recklessness inquiry as whether the defendant knew the defamatory meaning “was not just possible, but likely.”

Moore relied on the jury’s apparent rejection of testimony from PAC witnesses who said they did not intend the alleged implication, as well as the language of the ad and the PAC’s prepublication review. The court accepted that the jury could disbelieve the witnesses but held that disbelief did not itself supply affirmative evidence of the PAC’s state of mind when the ad was published.

“Simply because a statement reasonably can be read to contain a defamatory inference does not mean” that “the publisher of the statement either intended the statement to contain such a defamatory implication or even knew the readers could reasonably interpret the statements to contain the defamatory implication.”

The panel also rejected the argument that the ad itself established actual malice. It noted that the cited passages were accurate excerpts from the underlying reports and that the ad identified its sources. Although the court recognized that the two frames could convey the implication alleged by Moore, it held that this did not clearly and convincingly show that the PAC intended or recklessly conveyed that implication.

The PAC’s fact-checking process likewise did not support a finding of actual malice, the court held. Its research team reviewed proposed ads, assembled supporting sources, made edits, and submitted material for legal review. The failure to separately assess the alleged implication, the panel said, was at most “a negligent error,” which cannot establish actual malice.

Because Moore did not establish the intent component of actual malice, the court did not address whether he proved that Senate Majority PAC knew or recklessly disregarded the alleged implication’s falsity. The ruling directs judgment for the PAC and provides a framework requiring public-figure plaintiffs in implication cases to identify evidence directed to the publisher’s subjective intent or awareness of the claimed defamatory meaning.