Key Points

  • The Eleventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c) permits district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some state-law claims while declining jurisdiction over others after all federal claims are dismissed.
  • The panel found support for claim-by-claim management in the statute's text, which uses plural terminology in subsection (a) but singular terminology in subsection (c).
  • The court joins the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in rejecting any per se all-or-nothing rule for supplemental jurisdiction decisions.
  • The panel reversed summary judgment on Mueller's malicious-prosecution claim, finding a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the shoplifting charge was terminated favorably to him.
  • The case is remanded for further proceedings on the malicious-prosecution claim.

A federal district court that loses its original jurisdiction after dismissing all federal claims may still cherry-pick which state-law claims to keep and which to send back to state court, the Eleventh Circuit held Wednesday, joining the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits in rejecting any per se all-or-nothing rule under the supplemental jurisdiction statute.

The ruling in T. Mueller v. Walmart Corporation establishes for the first time in the Eleventh Circuit that 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c) permits claim-by-claim management of supplemental jurisdiction, a question the panel said had never been squarely decided in the circuit. The court also reversed summary judgment on the plaintiff's malicious-prosecution claim, finding a reasonable jury could conclude that a shoplifting charge against him was dropped independently of his plea agreement on a separate obstruction count.

The panel held that the statute "does not entail any per se prohibition that disables a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over some claims while declining jurisdiction over others," Judge Kevin Newsom wrote for the unanimous panel, which also included Judges Adalberto Jordan and Jill Pryor.

Todd Mueller had sued Walmart and employee Brandon Burston in the Northern District of Georgia after an incident at a Duluth store in which Burston suspected him of shoplifting. Mueller raised federal claims under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982, along with state-law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and battery. After Mueller abandoned his federal claims at summary judgment, the district court faced seven remaining state-law counts.

The district court took a split approach. It exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, granting summary judgment to the defendants on each. But it declined jurisdiction over the assault and battery claims, finding them "bitterly dispute[d]" and dependent on Mueller's credibility as a witness, and dismissed them without prejudice for resolution in state court.

Mueller appealed, arguing that the district court committed per se error by retaining some state claims while dismissing others. He contended that absent extenuating circumstances, a district court abuses its discretion when it exercises supplemental jurisdiction over some state-law claims but not others after all federal claims have been dismissed.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding support for claim-by-claim management in both the statutory text and sister-circuit precedent.

The panel pointed to Congress's careful use of singular and plural terminology in Section 1367. Subsection (a) grants supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims" that form part of the same case or controversy, the court noted, while subsection (c) provides that a district court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over "a claim" when certain conditions are met.

"The juxtaposition, we think, is both clear and instructive," Newsom wrote. "Subsection (a) contemplates that a district court may well have supplemental jurisdiction over multiple state-law 'claims'; subsection (c), in turn, empowers the court to decline to exercise that jurisdiction over any individual 'claim.'"

The court emphasized that supplemental jurisdiction remains "a 'doctrine of flexibility'" that allows district courts to "sensibly accommodate[] a range of concerns and values." Imposing an all-or-nothing rule would "scuttle that flexibility," forcing district courts to "embark on one of two undesirable courses: either dismiss claims it thinks it should keep or keep claims it thinks it should dismiss."

The court also noted that its holding aligns with the unanimous consensus of sister circuits. In Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., the Third Circuit allowed split exercise; the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Southerland v. Hardaway Management Co.; and the Tenth Circuit agreed in Nielander v. Board of County Commissioners.

On the specific facts of Mueller's case, the panel found no abuse of discretion in the district court's approach. The lower court "retained jurisdiction of those claims only as long as it took to reject them," Newsom observed, resolving the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims on summary judgment in the same order in which it dismissed the federal claims.

The district court concluded that Georgia law governing those three claims was clear-cut, presenting no thorny comity issues or significant resource expenditure. The assault and battery claims, by contrast, "required fact-bound judgments based on a mosaic of contested evidence."

"Put simply, the district court decided the claims it thought it could resolve quickly, and declined to decide those it thought it couldn't," Newsom wrote.

The panel rejected Mueller's argument that the district court's failure to explain more fully its reasoning was itself an abuse of discretion. "It is clear from the face of the district court's order—from its reasoning and disposition—that it deemed some claims easy and others more difficult," the court held.

But the Eleventh Circuit reversed on Mueller's malicious-prosecution claim, finding the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Under Georgia law, a malicious-prosecution plaintiff must show that the underlying charge was "terminated favorably" to him—a showing he cannot make if the charge was resolved as part of a plea or compromise.

The district court had concluded that Mueller's shoplifting charge was dropped as part of the same plea agreement covering his obstruction charge, foreclosing his malicious-prosecution claim. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, finding sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.

Mueller testified at his deposition that "as [he] understood it," his plea agreement was not related to the prosecutor's decision to drop the shoplifting charge. In a sworn declaration, he stated that "the District Attorney's Office unilaterally had decided not to pursue the Felony shoplifting case at that time because they were not prepared for trial which was scheduled the same day."

Additionally, the panel noted, neither the plea hearing transcript nor the final disposition document mentioned any connection between Mueller's nolo plea on obstruction and the government's decision to nolle pros the shoplifting charge.

"We think that this evidence, taken together, is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the nolle pros was independent of the plea agreement," Newsom wrote.

The court acknowledged that Walmart had marshaled contrary evidence, including statements by Mueller's counsel at the plea hearing discussing both charges "in tandem" and seeking to "resolve it" as a package. But at the summary-judgment stage, "we needn't—and therefore don't—weigh the evidence," the panel held.

The case now returns to the Northern District of Georgia for further proceedings on the malicious-prosecution claim. Mueller's assault and battery claims remain dismissed without prejudice for potential refiling in state court.